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Abstract. Moving data and applications to the cloud allows users and
companies to enjoy considerable benefits. However, these benefits are also
accompanied by a number of security issues that should be addressed.
Among these, the need to ensure that possible requirements on security,
costs, and quality of services are satisfied by the cloud providers, and the
need to adopt techniques ensuring the proper protection of their data and
applications. In this paper, we present different strategies and solutions
that can be applied to address these issues.
1 Introduction
The ‘Cloud’ has emerged as a successful paradigm that enables users and com-
panies to outsource data and applications to cloud providers, enjoying the avail-
ability of virtually unlimited storage and computation resources at competi-
tive prices. An ever-growing number of cloud providers offer a variety of ser-
vice options in terms of pricing, performance, and features. The advantages in
adopting cloud services, however, come also with new security and privacy prob-
lems [54,24]. A first important problem consists in selecting, among the wide va-
riety of cloud providers available on the market, the cloud provider most suitable
for the needs of applications and data to be outsourced. This requires to prop-
erly model the requirements and/or preferences and to match such requirements
with the characteristics and the service options offered by the cloud providers.
Clearly, these requirements may differ for different users and/or for different
data and applications that are moved to the cloud. Users therefore need flexible
and expressive techniques supporting both the definition of their requirements
and preferences, and the matching of these requirements with the characteristics
of the different cloud providers (e.g., [6,28]).
Another problem (which often may lead users and companies to refrain from
adopting the cloud for managing their data and applications) is related to ensur-
ing proper protection of the outsourced data. As a matter of fact, when data and
applications are moved to the cloud, they are no more under the direct control
of their owner and must be properly protected from unauthorized parties or the
cloud provider itself. Cloud providers may be honest-but-curious (i.e., trusted
for managing data but not to access their content) or may even have a lazy or
malicious behavior. Depending on the trust assumption that the user has on
the provider running the selected cloud service, different problems might need
to be addresses, including data confidentiality, integrity, and availability protec-
tion (e.g., [24]), the enforcement of access control (e.g., [16,19,34,59]), and the
management of fault tolerance (e.g., [38,39,40]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some
approaches enabling users to express their requirements and preferences as well
as possible strategies for selecting a cloud provider (or set thereof) that satisfies
such requirements and preferences. Section 3 discusses the main data security
issues that arise when using the cloud, and possible solutions to them. Finally,
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Supporting Users in Cloud Provider Selection
Due to the growing number of cloud providers offering services that differ in
their costs, security mechanisms, and Quality of Service (QoS), the research
and industry communities have dedicated attention to the problem of improving
the user experiences and the use of available cloud services. Industry security
standards such as the Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix [13] have
been proposed to allow cloud vendors and users to assess the overall security
risks of cloud providers. Also several techniques have been recently proposed
to assist data owners in selecting the cloud provider that better satisfies their
needs. In this section, we provide an overview of such techniques.
User-side QoS. A natural strategy to compare a set of candidate cloud providers
is based on measuring their Quality of Service (QoS) and comparing the results.
Cloud providers typically publish indicators about the performance of their ser-
vices in their Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Some of these indicators are
used as parameters to measure the QoS of the provider (e.g., the response time).
However, the value declared by the provider in its SLA (provider-side QoS) can
differ from the value observed by a user (user-side QoS). Also, different users can
experience different user-side QoS values for the same provider. For instance, the
response time observed by a user can differ from the one experienced by another
user operating in a different geographical area because they operate on networks
with different latencies. Therefore, if a user selects a cloud provider on the basis
of the provider-side QoS, she may end up with a choice not optimal for her.
To overcome this problem, some techniques introduced the idea of selecting the
cloud provider(s) based on the user-side QoS (e.g., [61]). A precise evaluation of
user-side QoS values can however be a difficult task. In fact, in many situations,
it requires to measure the parameters of interest (e.g., the response time) by
actually invoking/using the services offered by the provider. This practice may
cause communication overheads and possible economic charges that might not
be always acceptable. To solve this issue, QoS parameters could be predicted by
defining an automated QoS prediction framework that considers past service us-
age experiences of other “similar users”. Measured or estimated QoS parameters
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are finally used to rank all the (functionally equivalent) providers among which
the user can choose (e.g., [61]).
User requirements. A user may have different requirements (i.e., conditions)
that cloud providers should satisfy to meet the user’s needs (e.g., at least four
backup copies of the outsourced data should be maintained), or preferences on
the values of the characteristics of the cloud service (e.g., a user may specify a
value for the required availability and for the response time). User requirements
might depend, for example, on the specific application scenario (e.g., data that
need timely retrieval have to be stored at a provider with negligible downtime
and fast response time) as well as by laws and regulations (e.g., sensitive data
have to be stored at a provider applying appropriate security measures).
A line of research has investigated the definition of approaches to select the
cloud provider (or set thereof) that better satisfies all the users requirements (i.e.,
optimizing the values of the attributes of interest for the user). The proposed
solutions are typically based on the presence of a trusted middleware/interface
playing the role of a broker [33] in the system architecture. The broker takes
both the requirements of the user and the characteristics of the candidate cloud
providers (possibly expressed in a machine-readable format [52]) as input, and
tries to find the best match between the user requirements and the characteristics
of the cloud providers. This matching problem can become more complex when
a user defines multiple, may be even contrasting, requirements. In this case, it
is necessary to quantify the satisfaction of each requirement by each provider,
and to properly combine the measures associated with each provider. Multi-
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques have been proposed as one of the
basic approaches to address such a problem (e.g., [51]). Among the solutions
relying on MCDM techniques, SMICloud [30,31] adopts a hierarchical decision-
making technique, called Analytic Hierarchy Process, to compare and rank cloud
providers on the basis of the satisfaction of user requirements. SMICloud mod-
els user requirements as key performance indicators (KPIs) that include, for
example, the response time of a service, its sustainability (e.g., environmental
impact), and its economic costs. MCDM, possibly coupled with machine learn-
ing, has also been proposed as a method for selecting the instance type (i.e.,
the configuration of compute, memory, and storage capabilities) that has the
best trade-off between economic costs and performance and that satisfies the
user requirements (e.g., [47,55]). For each of the resources to be employed (e.g.,
memory, CPU), these proposals select the provider (or set thereof) to be used
for its provisioning as well as the amount of the resource to be obtained from
each cloud provider so that the user requirements are satisfied.
Besides expressing requirements over QoS indicators and KPIs, a user might
wish to formulate her requirements as generic conditions over a non-predefined
set of attributes characterizing the service delivery and the cloud provider. For
instance, to obey security regulations, a user may require that sensitive data be
stored only in servers located in a given country, even if the physical location
of a server is not an attribute explicitly represented in the provider SLAs. The
satisfaction of user-based requirements might depend on the (joint) satisfaction
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of multiple conditions expressed over the attributes declared by cloud providers.
Also, certain characteristics of a cloud provider may depend on other character-
istics. For instance, the response time of a system may depend on the incoming
request rate (i.e., the number of incoming requests per second), meaning that it
can be ensured only if an upper bound is enforced on the number of requests per
time unit. When checking whether cloud providers satisfy the user requirements
it is also important to consider such dependencies, accounting for the fact that
different services might entail different dependencies (e.g., two services with dif-
ferent hardware/software configurations might accept different request rates to
guarantee the same response time). Recent approaches have designed solutions
for establishing an SLA between a user and a cloud provider based on generic
user requirements and on the automatic evaluation of dependencies existing for
the provider (e.g., [26]). For instance, a dependency can state that a response
time of 5ms can be guaranteed only if the request rate is lower than 1 per second.
The solution in [26] takes as input a set of generic user requirements and a set of
dependencies for a provider. By adopting off-the-shelves Constraint Satisfaction
Problem (CSP) solvers, this technique determines a valid SLA (if it exists), de-
noted vSLA, that satisfies the conditions expressed by the user as well as further
conditions possibly triggered by dependencies. With reference to the example
above, if the requirement of the user includes a value for the response time, then
the generated vSLA will also include a condition on the request rate that the
candidate provider should also satisfy. Given a set of requirements and a set of
dependencies, different valid SLAs might exist. The approach in [25] extends the
work in [26] by allowing users to specify preferences over conditions that can be
considered for selecting, among the valid SLAs, the one that the user prefers.
Preferences are expressed over the values that can be assumed by the attributes
involved in requirements and dependencies (e.g., the one between the response
time and the request rate). Building on the CSP-based approach in [26], these
preferences are used to automatically evaluate vSLAs, ranking higher those that
better satisfy the preferences of the user.
Multi-application requirements. Many of the approaches for selecting cloud
provider(s) operate under the implicit assumption that a user is moving to the
cloud a single application at a time (or a set of applications with the same
requirements). Hence, the user requirements reflect the application needs. How-
ever, if a user wishes to outsource multiple applications to a single cloud provider,
the selection process may be complicated by the fact that different applications
might have different, even conflicting, requirements. Conflicting requirements
then need to be reconciled to find a cloud provider that better suits the needs
of all the applications. For instance, for an application operating with sensi-
tive/personal information, a user will likely have a strong requirement on the
security measures applied by the cloud provider (e.g., encryption algorithms,
access control), while for an application performing data-intensive computations
on non-sensitive information the same user will be more likely interested in per-
formance (e.g., processing speed and network latency). An intuitive approach
for considering the requirements of multiple applications in the selection of a
4
cloud provider consists in first identifying the provider that would be preferred
by each application singularly taken, and then in selecting the provider chosen
by the majority of the applications. While such an approach would certainly
choose a single provider, it may still leave the requirements of some applica-
tions completely unsatisfied. To overcome this problem, alternative approaches
based on MCDM techniques (e.g., [6]) aim at selecting cloud provider(s) in such
a way that the chosen provider(s) balances the satisfaction of the application
requirements, thus ensuring not to leave any application unsatisfied. Given the
requirements characterizing the needs of each application and a set of cloud plans
(among those available from cloud providers), the solution in [6] first adopts a
MCDM technique to produce, for each application, a ranking of the cloud plans.
Then, a consensus-based process is adopted to select the plan that is considered
more acceptable by all applications. In particular, the consensus-voting algo-
rithm takes as input the rank of each application and chooses the plan that
better balances the preferences of all applications. Note that this approach con-
siders all applications, and rankings produced by them, to be equally important
when computing a solution to reach consensus. This implies that the proposed
solution only considers the position of the plans in the ranking and does not
take into consideration their relative distance. The cloud provider chosen by
applying this technique may not be the first choice of any of the considered ap-
plications, but the technique guarantees that no application is left completely
unsatisfied. An interesting alternative to be investigated can consider the appli-
cation requirements by different applications as a single set of requirements to
be globally optimized, considering not only the rankings but the distance among
plans, possibly evaluating also preferences among applications.
Fuzzy user requirements. To express precise requirements on the characteris-
tics that should be satisfied by cloud providers, a user needs to have a technical
understanding of both the service characteristics and the needs of the applica-
tions. However, the identification of ‘good’ value(s) for a given attribute might
be challenging for some users, due to either a lack of technical skills, or the dif-
ficulty in identifying the precise needs for their applications. Also, the choice of
a specific value or of a precise threshold for an attribute may be an overkill in
many situations, imposing a too strong constraint. As an example, a requirement
imposing a minimum service availability of 99.995% would exclude a service with
a guaranteed availability of 99.990%, which – while less desirable – may still be
considered acceptable by the user. To provide users with higher flexibility in
the definition of their requirements, some works have considered fuzzy logic for
the specification and consideration of requirements (e.g., [15,28]). Fuzzy logic
can help users in defining their requirements in a flexible way whenever these
requirements cannot be expressed through crisp values over attributes or are not
easily definable. For instance, it is simpler for a non-skilled user to generically
require ‘high availability’ rather than specifying precisely which values are good
and which are not. In this example, ‘high availability’ maps to a set of values
for the availability attribute, which fit the definition of ‘high availability’ ac-
cording to the fuzzy membership function to be applied. In fact, the user and
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the cloud provider must agree on the meaning of the fuzzy values that a user
can use in the definition of her requirements. Fuzzy logic can be used also to
address other issues in cloud scenarios, including the evaluation of cloud service
performances (e.g., [49]) and the allocation by the provider of its resources to
users applications (e.g., [4,15,29,50]). In this context, the allocation of resources
to applications needs to take into account several aspects (e.g., the performance
of applications, users costs, energy consumption, and security). Hence, finding
an allocation that optimizes all these aspects is a difficult task that is usually
addressed through MCDM techniques. Also, fuzzy logic can be useful for sup-
porting flexible reasoning in resource allocation, especially in dynamic scenarios
where applications are frequently activated/deactivated.
3 Protecting Data in the Cloud
Moving data and applications to the cloud implies a loss of control of the data
owner over them and consequent concerns about their security. Guarantee data
and applications security requires to address several problems such as the pro-
tection of the confidentiality and integrity of data and computations as well as
data availability (e.g., [16,19,34,38,39,40,59]), the enforcement of access control
(e.g., [16,19,34,59]), and query privacy (e.g., [22,23]). In this section, we focus on
the solutions addressing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data.
3.1 Data confidentiality
The protection of the confidentiality of (sensitive) data is the first problem that
has to be considered when storing data at an external cloud provider. Sensi-
tive data must be protected from untrusted/unauthorized parties, including the
storing cloud provider, which can be considered honest-but-curious (i.e., trusted
to properly operate over the data but not to see their content). Current solu-
tions addressing this problem are based on the (possibly combined) adoption of
encryption and fragmentation.
Encryption. Wrapping data with a layer of encryption before outsourcing repre-
sents a natural and effective solution to protect the confidentiality of outsourced
data [53]. Indeed, only the data owner and authorized users, knowing the en-
cryption key, can access the plaintext data. Encrypting data before outsourcing
them guarantees that neither the cloud provider nor external third parties (pos-
sibly gaining access to the provider storage devices) can access the data content
in the clear. However, encryption makes query execution difficult because data
cannot be decrypted at the provider side. To address this problem, different so-
lutions have been proposed, including encrypted database systems supporting
SQL queries over encrypted data (e.g., [5,48]) and indexes for query execution
(e.g., [10,37]). CryptDB [48] is an example of encrypted database system that
supports queries on encrypted data. The idea is to encrypt the values of each
attribute of a relational table with different layers of encryption, computed us-
ing different kinds of encryption (i.e., random, deterministic, order-preserving,
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homomorphic, join, order-preserving join, and word search), which depend on
the queries to be executed. For instance, the values of an attribute can be first
encrypted using an order-preserving encryption schema, then a deterministic
encryption schema, and then a random encryption. Proceeding from the out-
ermost layer to the innermost layer, the adopted encryption scheme provides
weaker security guarantees but supports more computations over the encrypted
data. As an example, if the cloud provider has to execute a group by on such
attribute, the random encryption layer is removed since such encryption does
not allow to determine which values of the attribute are equal to each other.
Instead, deterministic encryption supports grouping operations, and therefore it
is not necessary to remove the deterministic encryption layer.
An index is a metadata associated with the encrypted data that can be used
by the cloud provider to select the data to be returned in response to a query.
Indexing techniques differ in the kind of queries supported (e.g., [2,14,37,57]).
In general, indexes can be classified in three main categories: 1) direct indexes
map each plaintext value to a different index value and vice versa (e.g., [14]);
2) bucket-based indexes map each plaintext value to one index value but differ-
ent plaintext values are mapped to the same index value, generating collisions
(e.g., [37]); 3) flattened indexes map each plaintext value to different index val-
ues, each characterized by the same number of occurrences (flattening), and each
index value represents one plaintext value only (e.g., [57]).
Besides indexing techniques classified as discussed, many other approaches
have been proposed. For instance, indexes based on order preserving encryption
support range conditions as well as grouping and ordering clauses (e.g., [2,57]),
B+-tree indexes [14] support range queries, and indexes based on homomorphic
encryption techniques (e.g., [32,36]) support the execution of aggregate func-
tions.
While promising, encrypted database systems and indexes present open prob-
lems, such as the possible information leakage and the still limited support for
query execution (e.g., [9,45]).
Fragmentation. Approaches based on encryption for protecting data confiden-
tiality work under the assumption that all data need protection. However, in
many scenarios, what is sensitive is the association among data values, rather
than values singularly taken. For instance, with reference to a relational table,
while the name of patients or the possible values of illness can be considered pub-
lic, the association among them (i.e., the fact that a patient has a given illness)
is clearly sensitive. Confidentiality can be guaranteed in this case by breaking
the association storing the involved attributes in separate (unlinkable) data frag-
ments (e.g., [1,10,11,12,17]). The application of fragmentation-based techniques
requires first the identification of the sets of attributes whose joint visibility (i.e.,
association) is considered sensitive. A sensitive association can be modeled as a
confidentiality constraint corresponding to sets of attributes that should not be
publicly visible in the same fragment. For instance, with respect to the previ-
ous example, confidentiality constraint 〈Name,Illness〉 states that the values of
attribute Name cannot be visible together with the values of attribute Illness.
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Fragmentation splits attributes in different data fragments in such a way that
no fragment covers completely any of the confidentiality constraint. Fragments
need to be unlinkable for non-authorized users (including cloud providers) to
avoid the reconstruction of the sensitive associations. Different approaches have
been proposed to fragment data, as summarized in the following.
– Two can keep a secret [1]. The original table is split in two fragments to
be stored at two non-communicating cloud providers. Sensitive attributes
(i.e., singleton confidentiality constraints) are protected by encoding (e.g.,
encrypting) them. Sensitive associations are protected by splitting the in-
volved attributes in the two fragments. If an attribute cannot be placed in
any of the two fragments without violating a confidentiality constraint, it is
encoded. Encoded attributes are stored in both fragments. Only authorized
users can access both fragments as well as the encoded attributes, and recon-
struct the original relation by joining the two fragments through a common
key attribute stored in both fragments.
– Multiple fragments [10,12]. The original table can be split into an arbitrary
number of disjoint fragments (i.e., fragments that do not have any common
attribute). The idea is that sensitive attributes are stored in encrypted form
while sensitive associations can always be protected by splitting the involved
attributes in different fragments. Each fragment stores a set of attributes
in plaintext and all the other attributes of the original table in encrypted
form. Authorized users know the encryption key and can reconstruct the
original table by accessing a single fragment (any would work) at the cloud
provider. The use of multiple fragments guarantees that all the attributes in
the original relation that are not considered sensitive by themselves can be
represented in plaintext in some fragments.
Unlinkability among fragments is ensured by the absence of common at-
tributes in fragments. Such a protection may however be put at risk by
data dependencies among attribute values since the value of some attributes
may disclose information about the value of others attributes. For instance,
knowing the treatment with which an individual is treated can reduce the
uncertainty over her disease. If these attributes are stored in different frag-
ments, they could be exploited for (loosely) joining fragments, thus possibly
violating confidentiality constraints. Data dependencies have then to be con-
sidered in the fragmentation design [17].
– Keep a few [11]. The original table is split into two fragments, one of which
is stored at the data owner side. Sensitive attributes are stored at the data
owner side while sensitive associations are protected by storing, for each
association, at least one attribute at the data owner side. This approach
permits to completely depart from encryption. An identifier is maintained in
both fragments to allow the data owner to correctly reconstruct the original
table. Since one fragment is kept by the data owner, an access request may
require her involvement.
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3.2 Data integrity and availability
In addition to data confidentiality, data integrity and availability are also critical
aspects. Data integrity means that the data owner needs guarantees on the
fact that cloud providers (and non-authorized users) do not improperly modify
the data without being detected. Verifying data integrity consists not only in
verifying whether the stored data have not been tampered with or removed
(integrity of stored data) but also in verifying the integrity of query results. The
integrity of a query result means that the result is correct (i.e., the result is
computed on the original data and is correct), complete (i.e., the computation
has been performed on the whole data collection and the result includes all data
satisfying the computation), and fresh (i.e., the result is computed on the most
recent version of the data). Existing solutions addressing these issues can provide
deterministic or probabilistic guarantees.
– Deterministic techniques provide guarantees of data integrity with full con-
fidence. Techniques for the integrity of stored data can be based on hashing
and digital signatures as building blocks (e.g., [8,35,44]). These solutions re-
quire data owners to access their data in the cloud to check their integrity
(which may imply high communication overhead). Deterministic guarantees
on the integrity of computation results can be achieved by building authen-
ticated data structures on the data (e.g., Merkle hash trees [43,46] and skip
lists [3,27]). Every computation result is then complemented with a verifica-
tion object VO, extracted by the cloud provider from the authenticated data
structure. By checking the VO, the requesting user can easily and efficiently
verify if the computation result is correct, complete, and fresh. While the
adoption of authenticated data structures has the advantage of providing
full confidence on the integrity of computation results, they are defined on a
specific attribute and hence provide guarantees only for computations over
it.
– Probabilistic techniques offer only probabilistic integrity guarantees, but are
more flexible than deterministic approaches. Traditional solutions providing
probabilistic integrity guarantees of stored data are Proof of Retrievability
(POR) and/or Provable Data Possession (PDP) schemes [7,41]. These so-
lutions either include sentinels in the encrypted outsourced data (POR) or
pre-compute tokens over encrypted or plaintext data (PDP) to provide the
owner with a probabilistic guarantee that the data have not been modified
by non-authorized parties.
Probabilistic guarantees on the integrity of computation results can be ob-
tained by inserting fake tuples as sentinels/markers in the original dataset
before outsourcing (e.g., [42,60]) or by duplicating (twinning) a portion of
the original dataset (e.g., [20,58]). If sentinels/markers and duplicates/twins
are not recognizable as such by the cloud provider, their absence in the com-
putation result signals to the requesting user its incompleteness. Clearly, the
higher the number of marker/twin tuples the higher the probabilistic guar-
antees obtained. It is interesting to note that these probabilistic strategies
9
can be jointly used as their protection guarantees nicely complement each
other [20,21] and can also be extended to work in a MapReduce scenario [18].
Data availability in the cloud can be interpreted as the ability of verifying
whether the cloud provider satisfies users’ requirements. Typically, the expected
behaviors of a cloud provider can be formalized using a Service Level Agreement
(SLA) stipulated between a user and the cloud provider itself. An SLA can
include confidentiality, integrity, and availability guarantees that the provider
undertook to provide. Some proposals have then investigated the problem of
how users can verify whether a cloud provider satisfies the security guarantees
declared in an SLA (e.g., [56]). Also the PDP and POR techniques previously
discussed for data integrity can also be used for verifying whether the cloud
provider stores the data as declared.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed the problems of enabling users to select cloud
providers that best match their needs, and of empowering users with solutions to
protect data outsourced to cloud providers. In particular, we have described tech-
niques that allow users to express their security requirements, possibly defined
for multiple applications and also using fuzzy logic, and to ensure confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of outsourced data.
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